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iN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF iDAHO 
CARLOS MARTINEZ (PORTILLO), 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
vs. 
EVELIA CARRASCO (MENDOZA), 
Respondent-Appellant, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 44622-2016 
Bingham County No. CV-2014-739 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health 
and Welfare, Child Support Services, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bingham County. 
Honorable Scott H. Hansen, Magistrate, presiding. 
Earl Blower, Esq. 
Residing at Idaho Falls, for Respondent-Appellant. 
Jared M. Harris, Esq. 
Residing at Blackfoot, for Petitioner-Respondent. 
James A Spinner, Esq. 
Residing at Pocatello, for Intervenor-Respondent. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from a petition to modify the child 
custody and child support provisions of a default judgment in a paternity suit. 
2. Course of Proceedings Below: Following entry of a default judgment 
that granted the petitioner-respondent (Carlos) sole physical custody of the parties' 
young child, the respondent-appellant (Evelia) moved to set aside the judgment. The 
trial court denied that motion. Evelia then filed a petition to modify the child custody and 
support provisions of the judgment. Following a trial on that petition, the magistrate 
entered a judgment granting the parties joint physical custody and requiring the child to 
travel between the parents' homes (a distance of about 913 miles) every three weeks. 
Evelia obtained leave to file a permissive appeal directly to the Idaho Supreme Court 
and then filed her notice of appeal. 
3. Concise Statement of Facts: In April 2013, Evelia and Carlos had a child 
without the benefit of marriage. The parties separated, and while Evelia and the child 
were living in California, Carlos filed a paternity suit in Bingham County, Idaho and 
obtained a default judgment granting Carlos sole physical custody of the child. Evelia 
moved to set aside the judgment. The trial court denied that motion. Evelia then filed a 
petition to modify the child custody and support provisions of the judgment. Following a 
trial, the magistrate entered a judgment granting the parties joint physical custody and 
requiring the child to travel between their homes (a distance of about 913 miles) every 
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three weeks. Evelia obtained leave to file a permissive appeal directly to the Idaho 
Supreme Court and then filed her notice of appeal. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the magistrate abuse his discretion in ordering that the parties share 
joint legal custody of their child by moving the child back and forth between the father's 
home and the mother's home every three weeks? 
2. Did the magistrate err in its award of child support (including basic child 
support, medical expenses and transportation costs)? 
3. Should the Idaho Supreme Court order a new trial? 
4. Should the Idaho Supreme Court award Evelia attorney fees on appeal? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Evelia seeks attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121 and 
Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P .3d 681, 696 (2016), if this case has not 
become final as of March 1, 2017. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. Background1 
While the respondent-appellant (Evelia) and the petitioner-respondent (Carlos) 
were living together in Idaho, Evelia became pregnant with Carlos's child. R Vol 1, pp. 
117 and 128. The parties separated, and Evelia travelled to Utah where she gave birth 
to the parties' child in April 2013. R Vol 1, pp. 118 and 128. According to the trial 
court's findings, Evelia returned to Idaho until the fall of 2013, when she moved with the 
child to California. R Vol 1, pp. 118 and 128. Apparently, Evelia and the child were in 
Idaho again in May and June 2014. R Vol 1, pp. 117-118. 
On April 16, 2014 (about a year after the child's birth), Carlos filed his Verified 
Petition to Establish Filiation, Child Support and Custody. R Vol 1, p. 2. Claiming he 
was unable to locate Evelia, Carlos served his petition on her by publication and 
obtained a default judgment on October 16, 2014. R Vol 1, p. 3. The court issued its 
Amended Judgment on December 29, 2014. R Vol 1, p. 21. Although the child had 
lived his entire life with his mother, the Amended Judgment awarded Carlos sole 
physical custody of the child. R Vol 1, p. 21. 
Carlos did not actually take custody of the child until about fifteen months later. 
During that time, the child continued living with Evelia in California. In late March 2016, 
Carlos unexpectedly approached Evelia at a Walmart near her home. Tr Vol 1, p. 128, 
1 To avoid unnecessary detail, the appellant is not reciting the background of the Intervenor's petition in a 
related case (which sought to establish child support) or the intervenor's participation in this case (which 
was minimal). 
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LI. 5-9 and R Vol 1, p. 118. Carlos told Evelia that his mother was visiting from Mexico 
and wanted to get to know the child. Tr Vol 1, p. 128, LI. 7-9. Evelia agreed that Carlos 
and his mother could visit overnight with the child and with Christian, her son from 
another relationship. Carlos said he would take the two children to his hotel and bring 
them back the next day. Tr. Vol 1, p. 128, L. 18 - p.129, L. 1. The next day, March 31, 
2016, Evelia called Carlos and arranged to meet him at Walmart to retrieve the children. 
Tr Vol 1, p. 129 LI. 6 and 18-25. When she arrived at Walmart, there was no sign of 
Carlos or the two children. She called Carlos, and he told her that he had left Christian 
outside her apartment and was taking the other child away. Tr. Vol 1, p. 129, LI. 2-17. 
Evelia called the police, who met with Carlos and then reported to Evelia that 
Carlos had seven days of vacation he wished to spend with the child. Evelia and Carlos 
agreed, through the police, that the child would stay with Carlos until Tuesday, when 
Carlos would return the child to Evelia in front of the police station. Tr Vol 1, p. 130, LI. 
3-22. On Tuesday (which would have been April 5, 2016), Evelia spoke with Carlos by 
phone while she was travelling to the arranged meeting place. He told her that he had 
taken the child to Idaho. Vol 1, p. 129, LI. 23-25. 
Nine days later, on April 14, 2016, Evelia filed a motion in this case challenging 
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and seeking to set aside the default judgment that had 
awarded Carlos sole physical custody. R Vol 1, pp. 4 and 26-31. Just six days later, on 
April 20, 2016, the magistrate convened a hearing on the motions. Declining to hear 
testimony, Tr Vol 1, p. 23, LI 2-6, the court heard argument, considered affidavits and 
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ruled from the bench, denying Evelia's motions.2 Tr Vol 1, p. 45, L. 4 - p. 46, L. 6. The 
court also ruled, sua sponte, that Evelia could immediately file a motion to modify the 
custody order. Tr Vol 1, p. 45, LI. 7-10. The court also set a trial for June 10, 2016 on 
Evelia's petition to modify custody. Tr Vol 1, p. 47, L 17 - p. 48, L. 10. The court then 
stated: 
Let me just throw out a suggestion to you. What I anticipate doing 
is saying that Dad will keep the child until the month of April is over, and 
then Mom can take the child for the month of May. And then Dad will get 
the child back for the month of June. So, we're just going to rotate it on 
that basis between on that [sic]. 
Now, that is not the best custody arrangement for this child. I 
understand that. But under the circumstances and the limited amount of 
time, it's somewhat fair to the parents -- probably not fair to your child, but 
it's fair to the parents. 
Now, if you men want to discuss that with your clients, you can do 
that. If not, we'll launch into a hearing at 4:00 o'clock. And what I'll do is I'll 
take a little bit of testimony from each of these parties for a few minutes, 
and then I'll issue a decision. 
THE COURT: So we'll start up at 4:00 o'clock. If you gentlemen 
want to agree to what I'm suggesting, you can. If not, I'll take some 
testimony, and then I'll make a decision in a little while. 
Now, I've told you what I think I'm going to do. I would hope you 
guys would get together and figure out something that's a little bit better. 
And I don't know what your resources are, but if you can't figure out 
something better, that's what's going to happen. It's going be a month-to-
month. 
2 Evelia later filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied after making written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. R Vol 1, pp. 117-119. 
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Tr Vol 1, p. 49, L. 3-p. 50, L. 24. 
Following a recess, the parties noted that Evelia would be living temporarily in 
Pocatello Uust 25 miles from Blackfoot), Tr Vol 1, p. 51, L. 25 - p. 52, L. 5. They agreed 
to a temporary order-from April 20 until June 10-which provided that they would 
exchange custody every two weeks with Evelia providing all transportation. Tr Vol 1, p. 
51, LI. 5-17. 
Evelia filed a Verified Petition to Modify Custody Order on April 26, 2016. R Vol 
1, pp. 5 and 96-100. She filed an amended petition on June 7, 2016. R Vol 1, pp. 112-
116. In her amended petition; Evelia asked the court to grant her primary physical 
custody of the child with reasonable visitation to Carlos. (Reasonable visitation would 
"include extended visitation in the summers, spring break, and holidays.") She also 
asked for child support. R Vol 1, pp. 112-116. 
On the day set for trial, June 10, the court proposed a continuance and then 
reset the trial for August 11, 2016. At the August 11 trial, 3 the court heard evidence and 
3 In its August 16, 2016 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the magistrate stated: "The Court 
conducted an informal trial with the Court conducting questioning and then the attorney's conducting 
questioning." R Vol 1, p. 147 (italics added). During the trial, the court and counsel stated: 
MR. RIVERA: ... Does the Court want -- how do you want to handle the testimony of 
this? 
THE COURT: Have either one of you filed the requisite requirement for strict adherence 
to the rule? 
MR. HARRIS: No, Your Honor. 
MR. RIVERA: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. That being the case, then, if you want, why don't you let me 
ask the questions, try to get the information I want, and then you gentlemen can follow up 
and cover the areas that I don't cover. 
MR. RIVERA: Very good. 
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argument and took the matter under advisement. The court issued its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on August 16, 2016. R Vol 1, p. 126. 
At trial, Evelia was represented by Nathan D. Rivera, Esq. On October 19, 
Evelia's current attorneys, Swafford Law, P.C., filed a Notice of Substitution of Counsel. 
R Vol 1, p. 8. 
The court issued its final judgment on October 28, and Evelia filed a motion for 
permissive appeal on November 1. Following a hearing, the magistrate issued his 
Order Granting Permissive Appeal on November 15. R Vol 1, p. 8. The Idaho Supreme 
Court issued its Order Granting Motion Requesting Acceptance of Appeal by 
Permission on December 8. Evelia filed her Notice of Appeal on December 15, 2016. 
2. The magistrate abused his discretion by ordering these parents-who live 
913 miles apart-to exchange custody of their three-year-old child every 
three weeks. 
a. The Idaho Supreme Court has established standards for determining 
when a magistrate has abused his discretion in making a child 
custody determination. 
Child custody determinations are left to the discretion of the magistrate court and 
will be overturned on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 
139 Idaho 448, 454, 80 P.3d 1049, 1055 (2003). 
Apparently, when the court referred to an "informal trial" in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the court was referring to the relaxed evidence standard contained in Rule 102 of the Idaho 
Rules of Family Law Procedure or to the magistrate's unusual procedure where he questioned 
each witness before allowing counsel to ask questions. The court could not have been referring 
to an "informal trial" under Rule 713 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure. Rule 713.B 
requires a consent and waiver under oath or in writing in a form adopted by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. No such consent and waiver was given in this case. 
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In Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 187 P.3d 1234 (2008), the court addressed 
the "single issue" of whether the magistrate court abused its discretion in making a child 
custody order. The court used a three-prong standard to make that determination. 
"This Court reviews discretionary decisions to determine whether the trial court (1) 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries 
of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the choices 
before it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Schultz v. Schultz, 145 
Idaho 859, 861-62, 187 P.3d 1234, 1236-37 (2008). 
As demonstrated below, the trial court here did not act "consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the choices before it" and did not reach its decision by "an 
exercise of reason." Accordingly, the magistrate court abused its discretion. 
b. The magistrate court did not act "consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the choices before it" because it failed to 
consider a critical factor. 
Idaho Code section 7-1126 states "In any proceeding to determine custody under 
the provisions of this chapter [Idaho's "Paternity Act"], the court shall apply sections 32-
717 through 32-717E, Idaho Code." Idaho Code section 32-717 states: "[T]the court 
may, before and after judgment, give such direction for the custody, care and education 
of the children ... as may seem necessary or proper in the best interests of the 
children." In determining custody, a child's welfare and best interest are of paramount 
importance. Shumway v. Shumway, 106 Idaho 415,679 P.2d 1133 (1984); Roeh v. 
Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 746 P.2d 1016 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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Idaho Code section 32-717 states that the court "shall consider all relevant 
factors" (italics added) and states that those factors may include: (a) the wishes of the 
child's parent or parents as to his or her custody; (b) the wishes of the child as to his or 
her custodian; (c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent 
or parents, and his or her siblings; (d) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school 
and community; (e) the character and circumstances of all individuals involved; (f) the 
need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child; and (g) domestic violence 
as defined in section 39-6303, Idaho Code, whether or not in the presence of the child. 
"This list of factors is not exhaustive or mandatory and courts are free to 
consider other factors that may be relevant." Peterson v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 318, 322, 
281 P.3d 1096, 1100 (2012) (quoting Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449,454, 197 P.3d 
310, 315 (2008)). The overarching requirement of section 32-717 is that the court "shall 
consider all relevant factors." 
A relevant factor that should be considered in a child custody case is the effect of 
frequent and extensive travel on a young child. In Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 
362, 347 P.3d 645, 654 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that minimizing 
travel associated with child custody and visitation in an important factor: "An increase in 
summer visitation, rather than visits every weekend during the school year, minimizes 
any negative impact on the children's lives due to ten hours of car travel every 
weekend." Similarly, in State v. Hart, 142 Idaho 721, 725, 132 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2006), 
the court held: "Uprooting a child every two weeks to travel and live in alternating 
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locations with alternating people raises serious concerns as to the welfare of the child." 
Additionally, in Krieger v. Krieger, 59 Idaho 301, 81 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1938), the court 
opined that the trial court should have given custody to one parent, stating: "The child is 
bound to suffer more or less from a change back and forth from one community to 
another and one school to another during the school year. That contingency should be 
avoided if, and in so far as, possible." 
Here, the evidence was clear: Evelia lives in Oceanside, California. Tr Vol 1, p. 
120, LI. 3-4. Carlos lives in Blackfoot, Idaho. Tr Vol 1, p. 188, LI. 11-12. According to 
Google Maps, those cities are 913 miles apart. Nevertheless, the magistrate ordered: 
The Petitioner (father) and the respondent (mother) shall share the 
physical custody of their child on a three-week rotation, meaning that the 
child will move back and forlh between the father's home and the mother's 
home every three weeks, subject to the following exception: the child shall 
live with the mother from December 20 through December 27 in every 
odd-numbered year, and the child shall live with the father from December 
20 through December 27 in every even-numbered year. 
The exchange of custody shall take place at the McDonald's 
restaurant in Barstow, California off 1-15 at exit 184. 
R Vol 1, pp. 135-6 (italics added). 
In his conclusions of law, the magistrate commented (in eight lines or less) on 
each factor from Idaho Code section 32-717. Neither there nor elsewhere did the 
magistrate mention the possibility of the negative effects a three-year-old child might 
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suffer from a 913-mile car ride every three weeks. His failure to consider that factor was 
an abuse of discretion. 
In Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 865, 187 P.3d 1234, 1240 (2008), the court 
found an abuse of discretion where the magistrate failed to consider relevant factors. 
The court held that over-emphasis of a single factor is an abuse of discretion and that 
failing to recognize other "factors and use them to evaluate the best interests ... 
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. 
Similarly, in Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 558, 746 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Ct. App. 
1987), the court held: "Essentially, the controlling issue on this appeal is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in deciding the custody issue by considering improper 
factors in making its determination, by failing to consider statutorily mandated factors, 
and by assigning too much weight to some factors while ignoring others." (Italics 
added). Here, the magistrate simply ignored an extremely important factor. 
Other courts have recognized that child custody orders requiring excessive travel 
are an abuse of discretion. In L.M. v. K.A., 177 So.3d 1174 (Ct. Civ. App. Ala. 2015), 
the appellate court found an abuse of discretion where the trial court's child custody 
order required twice monthly flights between Colorado and Alabama. The court held: 
"[W]e cannot conclude that the judgment in the present case requiring the child, who is 
now seven years old, to fly alone at least twice a month from Colorado to Alabama 
serves the best interests of the child. We, therefore, hold that the trial court exceeded 
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its discretion in its award of visitation and conclude that it should have fashioned an 
equitable visitation schedule that is less disruptive for the child." 177 So.3d at 1181. 
Similarly, in Maher v. Maher, 951 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), the court held 
that a child custody order requiring frequent travel by the child between St. Louis and 
Tampa was an abuse of discretion. The court lamented "the tremendous burden travel 
imposes on parent and child attempting to spend quality time together when they reside 
in distant locations" and "observed that the wear and tear of extensive travel diminishes 
the quality of the time spent together and may well engender deep feelings of 
resentment on the part of the child, the parent or both." 951 S.W.2d at 676. 
In Matter of the Paternity of Naomi G. Joe, 486 N.E.2d 1052 (Ct. App. Ind. 1985), 
the appellate court found an abuse of discretion where the trial court's child custody 
order required travel of 500 miles every two weeks. 
In Carr v. Howard, 777 So.2d 738 (Ct. Civ. App. Ala. 2000), the court held that 
the lower court abused its discretion in ordering travel on alternate weekends between 
Baldwin County, Alabama and Chicago. The court held: "The frequency and length of 
the travel required, in our opinion, must be a factor in the consideration of what serves 
the children's best interests. We do not believe the best interests of the children are 
served by having them spend every other weekend fighting the crowds at O'Hare 
International Airport." 777 So.2d at 742 (italics added). 
Here, the magistrate's decision does not even suggest that the court considered 
the impact on the child of travel between southern California and Blackfoot every third 
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week. According to Schultz, supra, the trial court's failure to recognize important 
"factors and [to] use them to evaluate the best interests ... constitutes an abuse of 
discretion." Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 865, 187 P.3d 1234, 1240 (2008). 
c. The magistrate court did not reach its decision by "an exercise of 
reason." 
(1) The magistrate acted on preconceived opinions rather than on 
an exercise of reason based on the facts presented to him. 
The record indicates that the magistrate reached his decision to award 50/50 
custody before hearing any evidence, and that he unfairly required to parties to try to 
disprove his preconceived opinions. Accordingly, the court did not reach its decision by 
a proper exercise of reason, and the resulting order was an abuse of discretion. 
Evelia first appeared before the magistrate on April 20, 2016 for a hearing on her 
motion seeking to set aside the default judgment for lack of jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA. After denying her motions from the bench, the court offered a "suggestion" 
that it would enter a temporary order rotating the child between the parents' homes 
monthly. Tr Vol 1, p. 49, LI. 3-13. The court offered counsel a brief recess to discuss 
that suggestion with Evelia and Carlos. The court indicated that if the parties did not 
agree with the court's suggestion, the court would "launch into a hearing at 4:00 o'clock. 
And what I'll do is I'll take a little bit of testimony from each of these parties for a few 
minutes, and then I'll issue a decision." Tr Vol 1, p. 49, LI. 14-18. 
Just before the recess, the magistrate warned: "Now, I've told you what I think I'm 
going to do. I would hope you guys would get together and figure out something that's a 
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little bit better. And I don't know what your resources are, but if you can't figure out 
something better, that's what's going to happen." Tr Vol 1, p. 50, LI. 19-24 (italics 
added). Given that option, counsel returned from a brief recess and agreed to 
alternating custody on a two-week basis. Tr Vol 1, p. 51, LI. 5-17. (As noted above in 
this brief, at that time, Evelia was living temporarily in Pocatello, just 25 miles from 
Blackfoot.) 
The magistrate took a stronger position during his opening remarks at the August 
11, 2016 trial. The magistrate noted that the child was about three years old and would 
not start kindergarten for about two years; then, the court stated: "So what the Court has 
in mind is to figure out what we're going to do about [his] custody for essentially the next 
two years, until he starts kindergarten." Tr Vol 1, p. 114, LI. 12-16. The court 
continued: "Between now and then, there's no reason the child shouldn't spend about 
half of his time with Mom and half of his time with Dad for the next two years." Tr Vol 1, 
p. 115, LI. 23-25. The magistrate indicated that the only issue he was considering was 
how to give each parent fifty percent of the time with the child: "So as we start this 
hearing, what I'm trying to figure out is is that going to be one-week/one-week? Is it 
going to be two-weeks/two-weeks? Is it going to be three weeks with Mom and then 
three weeks with Dad? Or is it going to be four weeks with Mom and four weeks with 
Dad?" Tr Vol 1, p. 116, LI. 1-6. 
The magistrate then offered to allow counsel to proceed: "if you attorneys think 
you've got some evidence that would move me off of that track, you're certainly entitled 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 19 
to it." Tr Vol 1, p. 116, LI. 7-9. The magistrate then explained the kind of evidence that 
might change his mind: "For example, if Mom can prove to me that Dad is a serious 
drug abuser, he's in and out of jail because he violates the law often, he's a serious 
alcoholic and can't parent because of that, then I would move off of that split custody 
arrangement." Tr Vol 1, p. 116, LI. 9-14. He offered a similar opportunity to Carlos if he 
could "prove to me that Mom has serious problems-for example, if she were an active 
prostitute, that would not be a good environment for the child, or if Mom had the alcohol 
or drug problem as I indicated like Dad might have." Tr Vol 1, p. 116, LI 15-19. 
Evelia suspects that the magistrate's fixation on an equal sharing of custody 
stems from a misinterpretation of Idaho Code section 32-717B. In his Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the magistrate quoted one phrase from section 32-717B. After 
noting that "Idaho Code 32-717 requires the Court to determine what custody 
arrangement will be in the best interests of child," the court stated: "The Court is also 
aware of IC 32-717B in which the Idaho Legislature requires Idaho judges 'to award 
joint custody providing that physical custody be shared by the parents in such a way as 
to assure the child frequent and continuing contact with both parents."' R Vol 1, p. 129. 
At no point in the decision did the court cite the remainder of that sentence from section 
32-717B. The entire sentence states: "Joint physical custody shall be shared by the 
parents in such a way to assure the child a frequent and continuing contact with both 
parents but does not necessarily mean the child's time with each parent should be 
exactly the same in length nor does it necessarily mean the child should be alternating 
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back and forth over certain periods of time between each parent." Excerpt from Idaho 
Code§ 32-717B(2) (italics added). 
The magistrate's announcing a decision before hearing evidence and his 
indicating that he would only change his mind if a party could show the other parent 
guilty of some gross misconduct demonstrates that the court did not reach its decision 
by a proper exercise of reason, and the resulting order was an abuse of discretion. 
(2) The magistrate's reasoning was adversely affected by his 
misunderstanding of the court's duty of fairness to the 
parents. 
As noted above, during the April 20, 2016 hearing on Evelia's motion to set aside 
the default judgment, the court first revealed its plan for an equal sharing of custody. As 
noted above, the court stated: "What I anticipate doing is saying that Dad will keep the 
child until the month of April is over, and then Mom can take the child for the month of 
May. And then Dad will get the child back for the month of June. So, we're just going to 
rotate it on that basis between on that." Tr Vol 1, p. 49, LI 4-8. The court then stated: 
"Now, that is not the best custody arrangement for this child. I understand that. But 
under the circumstances and the limited amount of time, it's somewhat fair to the 
parents -- probably not fair to your child, but it's fair to the parents." Tr Vol 1, p. 49, LI. 
9-13. 
Even though the magistrate recognized from the outset that a 50/50 custody 
arrangement would not be best for the child, he doggedly stuck to that arrangement 
throughout the proceedings and his final judgment. Accordingly, it appears the 
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magistrate misunderstood the court's responsibility to promote the best interest of the 
child even when that requires some unfairness to the parents. 
In a child custody proceeding, the trial court owes the parents a fair trial, a fair 
forum and a fair application of statutes and court rules; however, the court does not owe 
parents a fair division of custodial time with the child. In Krieger v. Krieger, 59 Idaho 
301, 81 P .2d 1081, 1083 ( 1938), the court held: "[T]he paramount issue in this 
proceeding is not the respective rights of the parents, which have already been litigated 
in the main (divorce) action, but rather the welfare of the child. The child's welfare as a 
normal human being and future citizen is the polar star by which the court must be 
guided in awarding its custody." 
The magistrate's reasoning was flawed because he promoted fairness to the 
parents above the best interest of the child. Accordingly, the magistrate abused his 
discretion. 
(3) The magistrate's reasoning was adversely affected by his 
assumptions-not grounded in the evidence-and his refusal 
to consider alternatives. 
While the magistrate was examining Evelia, she asked to show the court a video 
to demonstrate the child's behavior toward Carlos during visitation exchanges. She 
said: "I want to make a -- I want to ask a question to the judge. I would like for you to 
see a video of how [the child] acts when we -- when he sees Carlos, if it's possible." Tr 
Vol 1, p. 184, L. 25 - p., 185, L. 3. In refusing to watch the video, the court revealed 
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that it was relying on assumptions that had no roots in the evidence that had been 
presented at trial. The magistrate replied: 
THE COURT: The answer is no, and let me tell you why. 
I have raised four kids. I have two granddaughters that are two 
years old. The two-year-olds, if their parents bring them to my house to 
stay for one week, they cry and say they don't want to stay with us, with 
my wife and I. They want to go with their mom and dad. 
One week later, when their mom and dad come to pick them up 
after a trip, the kids don't want to go with their mom and dad. They want 
to stay -- they want to stay with Grandpa and Grandma, because they've 
bonded with us. 
[The child in this custody case] would have a lot easier time in all of 
this if you work really hard to make him want to be with his dad part of the 
time. If you say and do things that make him sense that you don't want 
him to be with his dad, then it makes it really hard for him to go with his 
dad because he wants to please you. So sometimes he will cry and act 
like he doesn't want to leave you because he knows that's what you want 
him to do. Children are smart. 
If the child knew that you really wanted him to go stay with his dad 
and you tried to make the child feel like he would be safe and okay with 
his dad, it would not be as difficult for the dad. 
So you showing me a video would probably just confirm what I 
think, which is you absolutely hate the idea of [the child] being with his 
dad, especially on an equal basis. So the video doesn't tell me or show 
anything I don't already know and understand about this case. 
A Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: (In Spanish) Gracias. 
Tr Vol 1, p. 185, L. 4 - 186, L. 11 (italics added). 
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The magistrate's comments reveal that he harbored certain assumptions not 
grounded in the trial evidence: first, that all two-year-old children-regardless whether 
they come from a fully-functional home or a broken home-will react in the same way 
when left with a caregiver they do not know well; second, that Evelia was doing and 
saying things to the child to make him not want to be with his father; third, that the child 
would be crying to please his mother rather than because he did not want to go with his 
father; and fourth, that the video (which the court had not seen) would "just confirm what 
I think, which is you absolutely hate the idea of [the child] being with his dad, especially 
on an equal basis." The evidence did not support those assumptions. 
Prior to the magistrate's stating that he believed Evelia "absolutely hate[d] the 
idea of [the child] being with his dad," no evidence had been offered to that effect. 
Evelia had been the only witness called at that point. Her testimony was that she had 
wanted Carlos to have communication with the child, and she detailed her efforts to 
accomplish that. See Tr Vol 1, p. 126 LI. 8 - p. 128, L. 4. See also, Tr Vol 1, p. 145 L. 
17 - p. 146, L. 1 (Carlos was in California a few weeks before the Walmart incident and 
visited with the child); Tr Vol 1, p. 146, LI. 5-9 (in 2014 Evelia took the child twice to a 
hotel where Carlos was staying); Tr Vol 1, p. 147, L 19 - p. 148, L. 10 (Evelia sent 
Carlos pictures of the child); Tr Vol 1, p. 1478, LI 8-18 (Evelia never refused a request 
by Carlos to see the child and "always wanted to -- for him to see my child"). 
The evidence also showed that when Carlos appeared unexpectedly at the 
Walmart in California, Evelia willingly let him take not just their child, but also Christian, 
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for an overnight stay at Carlos's hotel. See Tr Vol 1, p. 128, L. 7 - p. 129, L. 1. Even 
after Carlos failed to return the children the next day, Evelia agreed to let Carlos keep 
the child for a week while he was claiming to be vacationing in southern California. See 
Tr Vol 1, p. 130, L. 11-22. 
After the magistrate opined that the child was only trying to please his mother 
when crying about going with Carlos, Carlos testified: 
BY MR. HARRIS: 
Q. Carlos, what do you do to try to facilitate [the child] transitioning 
from your custody to his mother's custody? 
A A few days before the exchange, I start telling him he's going to 
see his mother. 
Q. And do you talk about that? 
A It's just difficult. / don't want him to cry; so I start telling him he's 
going to see his mother. 
Tr Vol 1, p. 197, I. 23 - P. 128, L. 6 (italics added). (Apparently, the child was not crying 
to please his mother (as the magistrate assumed), since Evelia was not even present at 
that time.) 
The magistrate's reasoning was flawed because he formed and expressed 
assumptions that were not based on evidence and because he refused to consider 
evidence that might run contrary to his assumptions. Accordingly, the magistrate 
abused his discretion. 
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(4) Summarizing, the magistrate's errors prevented him from 
reaching his decision through an appropriate "exercise of 
reason." 
Regardless whether the magistrate insisted on an equal sharing of physical 
custody because (1) he misinterpreted section 32-717B as requiring equal sharing, (2) 
he pre-judged the case, (3) he followed some misguided desire to assure a custody 
order that was "fair" to each parent, or (4) he relied on assumptions-not grounded in 
the evidence-about young children and the attitude of single mothers, his error 
prevented him from reaching his decision through an appropriate "exercise of reason." 
Accordingly, the decision was an abuse of discretion. 
3. The magistrate court improperly computed child support. 
a. The magistrate failed to make findings to support the child support 
award. 
Idaho Code section 32-706(5) authorizes the Idaho Supreme Court to adopt child 
support guidelines that utilize and implement the factors set forth in section 32-706(1) to 
create a uniform procedure for reaching fair and adequate child support awards. 
Section 32-706(5) also provides: "There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the 
amount of the award which would result from the application of the guidelines is the 
amount of child support to be awarded, unless evidence is presented in a particular 
case which indicates that an application of the guidelines would be unjust or 
inappropriate." The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted child support guidelines, and in 
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his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the magistrate here indicated that he was 
relying on the Guidelines in setting child support. R Vol 1, p. 130. 
The Idaho Child Support Guidelines are now contained in Rule 126 of the Idaho 
Rules of Family Law Procedure. Rule 126.J.1 provides: "The basic child support 
obligation shall be based upon the Guidelines Income of both parents, according to the 
rates set out in the schedules below." 
Regarding Guidelines' income, the magistrate court found: "M has worked in 
waitressing, house-keeping, but is currently unemployed" and that "F earns about 
$34,000 per year." R Vol 1, p. 128. In its Conclusions of Law, the court ruled: "The 
Child Support Guidelines call for F to pay M monthly child support of $226.13 per month 
(calculations attached)." R Vol 1, p. 130. The court's calculations show that the 
magistrate computed the child support amount by attributing $34,000 to Carlos-which 
was consistent with the findings of fact, and $15,080 to Evelia-which was inconsistent 
with the findings of fact. The magistrate's decision does not explain the discrepancy. 
Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 126.F.3.a allows the court to impute income 
to a parent who is voluntarily unemployed.4 The magistrate, however, made no finding 
4 Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure 126.F.3 states: 
a. Potential earned income. If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed, child support shall be based on gross potential income, except that 
potential income should not be included for a parent that is physically or mentally 
incapacitated. A parent shall not be deemed under-employed if gainfully employed on a 
full-time basis at the same or similar occupation in which he/she was employed for more 
than six months before the filing of the action or separation of the parties, whichever 
occurs first. On post-judgment motions, the six month period is calculated from the date 
the motion is filed. Ordinarily, a parent shall not be deemed underemployed if the parent 
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that Evelia was voluntarily unemployed even though it was a disputed issue. Evelia 
testified that she had lost her job and had not found another one. See Tr Vol 1, p. 122, 
LI. 20-24. Cross-examination on the issue was as follows: 
Q. (BY MR. HARRIS) When was the last time you had a job? 
A. (Spoke in Spanish but not translated.) 
Q. About a month ago? 
'A. (In English) Uh-Huh. About two days a week. 
Q. Why don't you get a -- why don't you get a job? 
A. (Unintelligible due to overlapping), and the lawyer said for me to 
wait, because I don't (unintelligible due to overlapping). Because I was 
working, and they paid me cash. (Spoke in Spanish but not translated.) 
MR. RIVERA: Just sparsely? 
THE WITNESS: (In English) Uh-huh. 
Q. (BY MR. HARRIS) So you're choosing not to work? 
A. But -- I was cleaning houses, restaurant work, but (translator 
inaudible). 
THE COURT: Driver's license? 
is caring for a child not more than 6 months of age. Determination of potential income 
shall be made according to any or all of the following methods, as appropriate: 
i. Determine employment potential and probable earnings level based on the 
parent's work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing job opportunities and 
earnings levels in the community. 
ii. Where a parent is a student, potential monthly income during the school term 
may be determined by considering student loans from any source. 
b. Potential Unearned Income. If a parent has assets that do not currently 
produce income, or that have been voluntarily transferred or placed in a condition or 
situation to reduce earnings, the court may attribute reasonable monetary value of 
income to the assets so that an adequate award of child support may be made. 
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THE WITNESS: (In Spanish.) Si. (In English) California. 
Q. (BY MR. HARRIS) You have a driver's license? 
A Yes. 
Q. So your attorney told you not to work? 
A The immigration lawyer. (Unintelligible due to overlapping). 
Q. So he told you not to work? 
A (Translator unintelligible) social security. 
Q. Right. 
A Just little things, like cleaning house when I can, work at the 
restaurant, whatever comes up, just like that. 
Q. Have you ever held a full-time job? 
A I have in the restaurant. That's why - but right now, before my 
social security comes, I could be with the child all day long. That won't 
happen here. He leaves early, comes back home late. (Translator 
unintelligible). 
Tr Vol 1, pp. 152, L. 18 - 154, L. 5. (This brief addresses the translation difficulties 
below.) 
Assuming, arguendo, that the magistrate could have determined from that 
exchange that Evelia was voluntarily unemployed, the law requires him to make findings 
of fact on the issue and to then base his conclusions of law on those findings. In Perry 
Plumbing Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494, 497, 531 P.2d 584, 587 (1975), the court 
explained: 
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It is a well established rule that the trial court must make findings upon 
each and every material issue arising from the pleadings, upon which 
proof is offered. Its failure to do so will necessitate a remand for additional 
findings, unless such findings would not affect the judgment entered. 
The purpose of the rule requiring the trial court to '* * * find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the 
entry of the appropriate judgment; * * *' is to assist the appellate court by 
affording it a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision. 
The absence of findings may be disregarded by the appellate court only 
where the record is clear. 
(Italics added). Here, the record is far from "clear," yet the magistrate made no 
findings that Evelia was voluntarily unemployed 
Similarly, the magistrate made no findings of fact to explain how he arrived at an 
income of $15,080 for Evelia. Even assuming the magistrate determined that Evelia 
was voluntarily unemployed, he demonstrated no process by which he arrived at the 
imputed income. Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 126.F.3.a states that "[i]f a 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, child support shall be based on 
gross potential income." It requires the court to determine potential income "according 
to any or all of the following methods, as appropriate: (i). Determine employment 
potential and probable earnings level based on the parent's work history, occupational 
qualifications, and prevailing job opportunities and earnings levels in the community." 
Here, the findings of fact and conclusions of law fail to make that analysis. 
Because the magistrate failed to make findings upon each and every material 
issue regarding the computation of child support, the Idaho Supreme Court should 
reverse the order and remand the issue. 
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b. The magistrate improperly allocated the responsibility for 
paying medical expenses. 
Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 126.H.4.a states: 
For each child support order, consideration should be given to 
provision of adequate health insurance coverage for the child. Such 
health insurance should normally be provided by the parent that can 
obtain suitable coverage through an employer at the lower cost. The 
actual cost paid by either parent for health insurance premiums or for 
health care expenses for the children not covered or paid in full by 
insurance, including, but not limited to orthodontic, optical, dental, 
psychological and prescription medication, shall be prorated between the 
parents in proportion to their Guidelines Income. These payments shall be 
in addition to basic child support and will be paid directly between the 
parties; however, the prorata share of the monthly insurance premium 
may instead be either a credit against or in addition to basic child support. 
(Italics added.) The statute requires the court to prorate medical expenses between the 
parties "in proportion to their Guidelines Income." Here, the court's child support 
calculations conclude that Evelia earns 30.73% of the parties' combined income and 
that Carlos earns 69.27% of the parties' combined incom~.5 R Vol 1, p. 133. Despite 
the clear mandate of Rule 126.H.4.a, the magistrate ordered, without explanation: "Each 
parent shall pay half of any uncovered medical expenses of Evan and each parent will 
provide health insurance for Evan if available at a reasonable cost." R Vol 1, p. 130. 
Because the order is contrary to the Rules, and not supported by any finding of 
fact, the Idaho Supreme Court should reverse the order and remand the issue. 
5 Without the imputation of income to Evelia (see part 3.a of this brief above), the percentages would be 
0% to Evelia and 100% to Carlos. 
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c. The magistrate made insufficient findings to support his allocation of 
transportation costs. 
Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 126.H.2 states: 
The court may order an allocation of transportation costs and 
responsibilities between the parents after considering all relevant factors, 
which shall include: 
a. The financial resources of the child; 
b. The financial resources, needs and obligations of both parents 
which ordinarily shall not include a parent's community property interest in 
the financial resources or obligations of a spouse who is not a parent of 
the child, unless compelling reasons exist; 
c. The costs and difficulties to both parents in exercising custodial 
and visitation time; 
d. The reasons for the parent's relocation; and 
e. Other relevant factors. 
(Italics added.) 
In this case, where the court has ordered that the child travel 913 miles every 
three weeks and where the parents' combined annual income is small, the allocation of 
transportation costs and responsibilities between the parents is a huge component of 
the child support award. Nevertheless, the magistrate makes no mention of the Rule 
126.H factors in his findings of fact and makes only the following reference in his 
conclusions of law: 
The Child Support Guidelines call for F to pay M monthly child support of 
$226.13 per month ( calculations attached); however, because F shall be 
doing the majority of the driving for the custody exchanges, F shall not be 
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required to pay M any child support- see IFLR 126(H)(2) because of the 
expense and time he will expend to facilitate custody exchanges. 
R Vol 1, p. 130. 
It appears the magistrate gave no consideration to the needs and obligations of 
the parents, the actual costs and difficulties associated with the travel or the reasons for 
Evelia's relocation to California as required by the rule. 
Earlier in his conclusions of law, the magistrate stated: 
Custody exchanges shall take place at the McDonald's restaurant 
in Barstow, California off 1-15 at exit 184. M has requested that she not be 
required to drive to St. George (halfway between Ocean Side, California 
and Blackfoot, Idaho) for the exchanges and that she would waive child 
support if F would do the majority of the traveling for the custody 
exchanges. 
R Vol 1, p. 130 (italics added). Presumably, Evelia's "waiver" figured into the 
magistrate's decision to allocate transportation costs by ordering that Carlos pay no 
child support. If so, the court erred. 
The magistrate's conclusion that Evelia stated she "would waive child support if F 
would do the majority of the traveling for the custody exchanges" apparently stems from 
a comment Evelia made when the court was urging her to choose a method of sharing 
the child "50/50." 
Q. And if I divide the custody on a 50/50 basis, do you want to have 
one-week/one-week? Two-weeks/two-weeks? Three-weeks/three-
weeks? Four-weeks/four-weeks? Do you have a preference? 
A Can I make a comment before I answer the question? 
Q. Yes. 
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A. It's very difficult for me to be driving so many hours if I have a flat 
tire with two children. I was thinking if this was going to happen, / wanted 
to pay gas for Carlos, and he would come to pick him up in California. 
Because I'm a woman. I have two children. The children get really mad 
when they're traveling and in traffic and other things. And on Sundays it's 
really crazy because that traffic is really congested. On Saturday is better. 
Q. Saturday is better? 
A. He doesn't have to pay child support. I'll pay for the gas, please. 
Q. One-week/one-week? Two-weeks/two-weeks? Three-
weeks/three-weeks? Four-weeks/four-weeks? 
Tr Vol 1, p. Tr Vol 1, p. 183, L. 11 - p. 184, L. 6. 
The obvious question, of course, is whether Evelia was intending to waive child 
support or simply pleading that she not be required to drive from Oceanside to Blackfoot 
one or more times each month. More important, if she was offering to waive child 
support, she had no right to do so. 
In Garnerv. Garner, 158 Idaho 932, 937-39, 354 P.3d 494, 499-501 (2015), the 
court explained: 
The legislature's enacted purpose for the child support guidelines is "to 
create a uniform procedure for reaching fair and adequate child support 
awards." I.C. § 32-706(5) .... It has long been the policy in Idaho that 
parents cannot waive a child's right to support. "Child support is for the 
benefit of the children. Although a mother may benefit indirectly from child 
support payments, she is not the real person in interest who can waive the 
rights of the child." Alber, 93 Idaho at 758, 472 P.2d at 324. In Idaho, "[in] 
any proceeding where child support is under consideration, child support 
shall be given priority over the needs of the parents .... " I.C.S.G. § 4(b). The 
requirement that deviations from the Guidelines amount must be supported 
by specific findings is there to protect the child entitled to the support. 
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The reason for the child support statute, and the Guidelines it 
authorizes, is to make sure judges are making decisions in the children's 
best interests . ... [T]he legislature has enacted a mandatory, rebuttable 
presumption that the amount of child support in the Guidelines is the 
correct amount of support. That statute plainly provides: 
... If the court determines that circumstances exist to permit 
a departure from the guidelines, the judge making the 
determination shall make a written or specific finding on the 
record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust 
or inappropriate in the particular case before the court. 
I.C. § 32-706(5). 
The rules are quite clear that in all cases, the child support awarded 
must be the amount stated in the Guidelines unless some evidence justifies 
a deviation. It is the judge's duty to explain the reason for any deviation. 
There is no exception in the rules or the statute for agreements between 
the parties . ... 
[E]ven our court rules say there shall be findings of fact and conclusions in 
the trial court: "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. ... " I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
The purpose of this rule is to give the appellate court a "clear 
understanding of the trial court's decision so that it may determine whether 
the trial court applied the proper law in reaching its ultimate judgment." 
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho 424, 427, 64 P.3d 953, 956 (2003). 
The fact that the parties were represented by counsel when they 
entered into the agreement does not change the fact that the judgment 
originally entered in this case called for a significant, unsubstantiated 
deviation from the Guidelines. Both the statute and the Guidelines call for 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law for a substantial deviation from the 
Guidelines. Nothing in our precedent suggests that representation by 
counsel changes that. ... 
[/]it is for a judge to ... make the required findings before abdicating to the 
parties' stipulation. There must be some action by counsel or the court to 
examine the relevant facts and show reasons for the award of such a small 
amount of support. The primary concern for everyone involved, including 
the attorneys and the court, must be the child's best interests. 
The magistrate did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards 
in that the amount of child support awarded originally is a gross and 
substantial deviation from the Guidelines amount and, under the rules, the 
presumption of the Guidelines amount constitutes a material change 
permitting a motion for modification. It was therefore error for the district 
court to affirm the magistrate's ruling. 
(Italics added. Footnote omitted.) 
Here, the magistrate construed Evelia's comment as a complete waiver of child 
support in exchange for Caries's driving an additional 275 miles. Evelia could not make 
such a waiver under Idaho law. The court's order was a substantial deviation from the 
Guidelines, but the magistrate did not support that deviation with specific findings and 
apparently gave no consideration to whether the deviation would promote the child's 
interests. Accordingly, the order allocating the responsibility for transportation costs by 
denying child support should be reversed and remanded. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 36 
d. The court made its decision on child support, at least in part, to 
accomplish an improper purpose. 
During the November 15, 2016 hearing on Evelia's Motion for Permissive Appeal, 
the magistrate indicated that he used his child support order to try to bait Evelia into 
moving from California to Idaho: 
Well, this will be twice that I've said this today, and I hardly ever say 
this, which is probably a bad thing. I should say it more often, and, that is, 
I'm pretty humble about some of these decisions. I'm not totally sure if 
they're right or wrong. And in this case, I don't know if it's right or wrong 
for this boy to be moving back and forth three times [sic]. 
The other thing that this Court looked at was it looked to me like 
Mom was in a position to make the move much easier than Father, and so 
I tried to bait her into moving, if you will, to some extent, by putting in the 
clause that, if she would move to Pocatello or closer where she has some 
family, some connections, and she's lived before, that he would start 
paying child support -- and I can't remember. I think I indicated maybe 
one-week/one-week or something, again, realizing that, even if she moves 
to Pocatello, we're still going to have to revisit this in two years. 
Tr Vol 1, p. 272, LI. 2-25 (italics added). 
In Markwood v. Markwood, 152 Idaho 756, 759-60, 274 P.3d 1271, 1274-75 (Ct. 
App. 2012), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained that family law courts must not try to 
dictate where a parent will live. 
In Allbright v. Allbright, 147 Idaho 752, 215 P.3d 472 (2009), the 
Idaho Supreme Court made it very clear that in custody cases, an Idaho 
court may not dictate where a parent will live. Rather, the court may only 
issue orders for the custody and care of children in view of the location or 
relocation of the parents places of residence. 
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The Court [in Allbright] explained: 
A court's authority in a divorce action is not 
conterminous with what the court determines to be the best 
interests of the child. . .. The statute [Idaho Code § 32-
717 ( 1 )] authorizes the court to give direction for the custody, 
care, and education of the child. It does not authorize a 
court to decide the geographic area in which the parent or 
parents of the child shall live. 
[The court] can determine with which parent the child will 
reside, but it cannot determine where either parent will 
reside. 
A court presiding over a child custody matter does not 
become a family czar with unlimited authority to order the 
parents to do anything that the court believes is in the best 
interests of the child. ... 
There is no doubt that it would be in the best interests of [the 
child] for her parents to live in close enough proximity that 
they can both have frequent and continuing contact with and 
physical custody of her .... However, the magistrate court 
had no authority to order Mother to reside in any particular 
geographical location. 
Allbright, 147 Idaho at 754-56, 215 P.3d at 474-76. 
(Italics added.) 
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Because the court's fashioning a child support order to "bait" Evelia into moving to Idaho 
was an improper purpose, the magistrate did not act "consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the choices before it" and abused its discretion.6 
4. The Supreme Court should order a new trial. 
a. The Supreme Court has the discretion to order a new trial. 
Idaho Code section 1-205 states, in relevant part, that the Idaho Supreme Court 
"may reverse, affirm or modify any order or judgment appealed from, and may direct the 
proper judgment or order to be entered, or direct a new trial or further proceedings to be 
had." 7 (Italics added.) 
In Clark v. Clark, 89 Idaho 91, 95-96, 403 P.2d 570, 573 (1965), the trial court 
failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law following a child 
6 At trial, Evelia testified that it would be difficult for her to move to Blackfoot: 
MR. HARRIS: 
Q. Is there any reason why you don't move to Blackfoot? 
A My allergies and the snow. I don't like the climate. I don't like to drive in the 
snow. I'm kind of one of those guys. 
A Because I can't live here. The allergies would kill me. (Spoke Spanish but not 
translated.) 
MR. RIVERA: She says her throat closes up, her eyes water constantly. 
THE WITNESS: My allergies are really bad. The allergies are too bad. My throat 
closes. I'm crying all of the time. 
Q. (BY MR. HARRIS) So you lived here before? 
A The allergies started in September of 2013 when I was pregnant. And I had 
two more summers here before I was in court. I can't be here to have something happen 
with my throat. 
Tr Vol 1, p. 149, LI. 3-7 and p. 150, LI. 6-17. 
7 I.AR. 112 authorizes Idaho Court of Appeals to "direct a new trial." Curiously, a similar rule does not 
appear to authorize the Idaho Supreme Court to direct a new trial. Nevertheless, I.AR. 48 provides: "In 
cases where no provision is made by statute or by these rules, proceedings in the Supreme Court shall 
be in accordance with the practice usually followed in such or similar cases, or as may be prescribed by 
the Court or a Justice thereof." It has certainly been the practice of the Idaho Supreme Court to direct a 
new trial under appropriate circumstances. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 39 
custody trial. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled: "The order modifying the 
decree for custody of the children is reversed and a new trial is granted, at which time 
the whole case may be retried and the custody, care and best interests of the children 
may he further examined into and considered." 
In Holden v. Holden, 63 Idaho 70, 116 P.2d 1003 (1941), the supreme court 
granted a new trial in a child custody case, noting that they were reversing the judgment 
and remanding the case, that more than a year had passed since the court heard the 
testimony and saw the parties, and that child custody orders can be modified from time 
to time. The court "concluded that it will be to the best interests of all concerned and will 
best promote the ends of justice, to direct that this case be retried." 116 P.2d at 1004. 
In Krieger v. Krieger, 59 Idaho 301, 81 P.2d 1081 (1938), the supreme court 
found that the trial court's child custody award was not supported by the findings of fact, 
and held: "In view of the findings as hereinbefore indicated and the evidence introduced, 
we have concluded that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for further 
hearing." 81 P.2d at 1084. 
This case bears similarities to Clark, Holden and Krieger. Like the trial court in 
Clark, the magistrate here failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Like the circumstances in Holden, by the time this appeal is resolved, many 
months will have passed since the lower court heard the testimony and saw the parties; 
memories will have faded, and circumstances relevant to a proper custody 
determination will have changed. Here, as in Holden, a new trial "will be to the best 
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interests of all concerned and will best promote the ends of justice." Holden v. Holden, 
63 Idaho 70, 116 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1941). 
b. Factors in this appeal support an order directing a new trial. 
(1) The magistrate court improperly limited the trial by 
considering only two years of custody. 
As noted above, the magistrate-sua sponte-limited the issue at trial to custody 
covering only about two years, thus all but guaranteeing an additional custody dispute 
shortly. Tr Vol 1, p. 114, LI. 12-16. Assuming this case is remanded, promptly 
developing a long-term custody order will best serve the interests of the minor child and 
his parents. 
Children and their parents deserve to have a future with as few uncertainties as 
possible. A good home life includes, among other things, being able to plan for the 
future. That, as much as anything, enhances a parent's ability to "promote continuity 
and stability in the life of the child" as contemplated in Idaho Code section 32-717(f). 
1f this court returns this case to the magistrate court without instructions for a new 
trial, another year or more will pass with uncertainty. Instead, the case should be 
remanded for a new trial with instructions that the custody period under consideration 
not be limited to a few months or a few years. 
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(2) Problems with the Spanish translation and the trial transcript 
recommend a new trial. 
By the time this case is remanded, many months will have passed since the court 
heard the evidence. Memories will have faded, and the possibility of the court's 
remembering all relevant facts will be small. 
Ordinarily, the trial transcript would offer the trial court a resource on remand. In 
this case however, the transcript is substantially flawed. Both Evelia and Carlos speak 
Spanish, and the court conducted the trial with the aid of a single interpreter. See Tr 
Vol 1, p. 113, LI. 14-21. Unfortunately, the interpreting did not go smoothly and the 
transcript reflects that. 
The trial transcript is 160 pages. See Tr Vol 1, p. 107-267. Within those 160 
pages are at least 70 instances where testimony was lost because the examination was 
"[u]nintelligible due to overlapping" or the answer was "[s]poke [sic] in Spanish but not 
translated." Some of the difficulties are illustrated in part 3.a of this brief (above) in 
relation to question about whether Evelia was voluntarily unemployed. The trial court 
and counsel also noted the limitations of the translation.8 
8 For example, the court and Evelia's attorney had the following exchange during the cross-examination 
of Evelia: 
THE COURT: His job [Caries's attorney] is to ask questions fast and get her stirred up. 
MR. RIVERA: Right. 
THE COURT: That's what he's supposed to do. 
MR. RIVERA: But you can't do that with an interpreter. It doesn't work the same way. 
THE COURT: But she doesn't get to use the interpreter to try to make it so that he can't do 
his job properly, and that's what's going on here subconsciously. Intuitively, that's going 
on. She's using the interpreter to mess with him. So they're messing with each other -- is 
what's going on here. 
Tr Vol 1, p. 172, LI. 14-25. Later, the court explained: 
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In Brashearv. Brashear, 71 Idaho 158,164,228 P.2d 243, 247 (1951), the court 
ordered a new trial, holding that the "determination of the custody of children is of such 
a serious nature, that the court should never act upon less than all and the best, 
evidence available, having any bearing on the question of welfare." 
Ordering a new trial would allow the trial court and the parties an opportunity to 
cure the interpretation problems. The August 2016 trial was conducted in a single day; 
at a new trial, the pace could be slowed and the problems with interpretation addressed 
more fully. 
THE COURT: Well, we should probably point out something that's obvious here 
that applies equally to Mom and Dad. 
We have a language barrier. And as you folks know, there's about four tiers at 
which people communicate in a foreign language. These good folks are probably at the 
lower tier. No, they're probably at the second tier. The second tier is some familiarity. If I 
go to Mexico and I spend two weeks down there, I get to where I can pretty well 
understand Spanish. I can't speak much, but I understand quite a bit. 
The third tier is where we get fairly conversant and we can talk pretty good. A 
Mormon missionary is a good example. They come back at the third tier. 
To get to the fourth tier of language level, that's where you can participate in a 
debate and understand the nuances of the debate and pick that up and respond 
appropriately. And that normally takes as much as 15 years in-country to get to that level. 
So what we have here is both of you attorneys have engaged these people in 
kind of a debate kind of at the second tier of communication, which is pretty low. 
Normally, when we hold court here, we hold court at the fourth tier, and everybody gets 
along and we understand the nuances. But both of these folks are at a disadvantage. 
So the Court is aware of that. ;You gentlemen are aware of that. And so we just 
have to fill in the gaps and do the best we can here. 
And so as you try to engage these people in those kinds of debates, that's what's 
happening. A fourth tier-- asking a fourth tier question, and we're getting responses at a 
second tier. 
Next question. 
Tr Vol 1, p. 214, L. 19 - p. 215, L. 25 (italics added). 
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(3) A new trial will protect the reputation and integrity of the 
courts by allowing the parties an opportunity to exercise a 
disqualification under Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 
107.F. 
Rule 107 .F of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure allows each party file a 
motion to disqualify the trial judge without cause when a new trial is ordered. This court 
has tacitly recognized that some reversals may create distrust of the courts if the case is 
remanded to the same trial judge. For example, in Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho 805, 
379 P.3d 1073, 1079 (2016), the court stated "that assignment of a new judge on 
remand will 'eliminate any concern of bias. Therefore, this Court orders that the case on 
remand be assigned to a new district judge." After reversing a child custody order in 
Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 866, 187 P.3d 1234, 1241 (2008), the court 
remanded the case to "a new magistrate judge." 
Here, allowing the parties an option for another judge would create an image of 
fairness and promote trust in the judicial system. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the court should vacate the trial court's October 
28, 2016 Judgment and remand the case for a new trial. 
Dated January ~t:) 2017. 
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